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INTRODUCTION
“The field of administration is a field of business,” Woodrow Wilson asserted in his 1887
paper entitled “The Study of Administration,” originating the concept of public administration.
Written while he was a professor at Bryn Mawr College, this groundbreaking paper initiated the
push for efficiency in government. The discipline of public administration, which emerged from
this idea, applied scientific business management techniques to governmental management in
order “to rescue executive methods from the confusion and costliness of empirical experiment and
set them upon foundations laid deep in stable principle.”1 Wilson identified waste and inefficiency
in government as challenges that could be solved with proper management, saying, “Waste is also
weakness. Inefficiency brings confusion.” His goal in establishing these principled methods of
government management was to ensure that government expenditures were wholly spent on
“something done or provided for the people.”2 If not spent on the people, the money was wasted.
Ninety-five years later, President Ronald Reagan took the idea of government efficiency
even further when he set up a cost control commission headed by a private businessman.
Speaking to the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, Reagan excitedly remarked, “I have
just met with J. Peter Grace, who will be the new Chairman of the Private Sector Survey on Cost
Control in the Federal Government. Mr. Grace is an outstanding businessman…and he promised
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me that he and his new team will work like tireless bloodhounds, leaving no stone unturned in
their search to root out inefficiency and waste of taxpayer dollars.”3 If government efficiency
was the goal of public administration, then—in Reagan’s opinion—the most qualified person to
achieve that goal was a successful businessman.
J. Peter Grace, the charismatic yet controversial CEO of W.R. Grace & Co., led a storied
career at the helm of the international corporation bearing his family name. Grace’s leadership at
one of America’s largest corporations made him the prime candidate to lead Reagan’s new cost
control commission in 1982. Yet, this political power also came at a most opportune time for
Grace, whose firm faced several investigations by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and other government regulators. His almost forty-year private sector tenure involved numerous
environmental and consumer disasters; the thirty-nine EPA Superfund Sites for pollutant cleanup
in twenty-one states attributed to W.R. Grace & Co. during the second half of the twentieth century
reflected this destructive public health record.4 These included W.R. Grace’s chemical pollution
of the Woburn, Massachusetts, water supply, upon which a 1995 book and the 1998 Oscarnominated movie starring John Travolta, A Civil Action, were based. At an additional cost to the
public’s safety, W.R. Grace & Co. manufactured the wildly profitable Zonolite insulation from
1963 through the 1980s. This carcinogenic, asbestos-laden product constituted one of the most
notable consumer and environmental scandals in United States history, and there is proof of J.
Peter Grace’s early awareness of Zonolite’s danger and his complicity in the decades-long

3

Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at the Los Angeles County, California, Board of Supervisors' Town Meeting,"
Speech presented at Dorothy Chandler Pavilion Auditorium, Los Angeles, CA, March 3, 1982, The American
Presidency Project.
4
United States Environmental Protection Agency, "Case Summary: EPA Receives over $54 Million from
W.R. Grace Bankruptcy," epa.gov.

3
coverup. As the EPA and other government regulators began deeper investigations into the health
implications of the manufacture and widespread use of Zonolite, J. Peter Grace, through his
involvement with Reagan’s cost cutting commission, had the opportunity to weaken their
regulatory power to save his company, his shareholders, and himself.
In the early 1980s, the combination of Reagan’s neoliberal and federalist public sector
policies and the private sector’s budding model of shareholder value capitalism resulted in his
attempt to make the government run like a business, which he implemented through the President’s
Private Sector Survey for Cost Control in the Federal Government—an advisory committee of
business volunteers more popularly known as the Grace Commission. Drawing on Wilson’s idea
of public administration, Reagan stated to members of his administration, “I'm determined that,
when this administration leaves the stage, the American people will have a Federal Government
that operates in a businesslike manner. Now, that means providing high-quality, essential public
services as efficiently as possible.”5 President Reagan’s Executive Order 12369, which established
the Grace Commission, envisioned the commission’s reports to be informed by private sector
managerial excellence in order to identify wasteful inefficiencies in government agencies. Instead,
the thousands of pages of the resulting Grace Commission reports were a conglomeration of
suggestions for management improvements polluted with partisan deregulatory policy
recommendations and private sector conflicts of interest. A number of such recommendations
furthered the Reagan agenda to weaken the regulatory framework of consumer and environmental
protection agencies, notably the EPA—one of several regulatory watchdogs concurrently
investigating J. Peter Grace’s own W.R. Grace & Co. for its numerous deadly chemical disasters.
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These aspects of the Grace Commission reports show that Reagan’s agenda of “running the
government like a business” was much more than simply implementing Wilson’s management
efficiency principles; rather, it was an effort by both Reagan and Grace to advance private sector
interests in government. More broadly, these reports point to the inherent contradictions of
reconciling the citizen-oriented functions of government with the shareholder-oriented functions
of the private sector.

The Origins of Big Government
Reagan’s domestic agenda was largely a reaction to the expansion of active federal
government intervention in American life. When President Franklin D. Roosevelt pioneered the
1930s New Deal legislation and domestic programs to address the numerous problems that the
Great Depression exposed in the U.S. economy and society, he ushered in a more active role for
government based on Keynesian economic theory. Keynesians sought to stabilize the economy
by balancing the cyclical economic booms (economic expansion) and busts (economic recession)
known as the business cycle with countercyclical fiscal policies in the form of direct government
intervention.6 Along with the newly prominent support for government activism to alleviate
economic recession came the attitude that the government had a duty to care for its citizens.
Support for government aid rose in the public imagination and, thus, in many politicians’
legislative agendas. While left-wing New Deal supporters favored the programs’ numerous
benefits to American livelihood, right-wing adversaries found that these programs were costly and
that they increased the role of government beyond what they believed it should be.
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President Lyndon B. Johnson spearheaded the 1960s Great Society legislation in a similar
fashion to the New Deal. With an even sharper focus on social prosperity, Johnson implemented
major government programs such as Medicaid, Medicare, and a collection of initiatives known as
the War on Poverty, as well as embracing a more active federal role in the promotion of social
justice through legislation such as the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act. During a period of
economic growth and prosperity, these sets of domestic policies indicated a broader role for
government intervention beyond just recession avoidance, inflation control, and unemployment
reduction towards facilitating domestic social reform.
In a nonpartisan attempt to utilize government resources for the common good of U.S.
citizens, President Richard Nixon established the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970 as a
response to growing public concern on the environment. The environmental movement began to
materialize in the early 1960s, as an ideological understanding of pollution took shape and people
began to experience the effects of environmental decline firsthand. Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring
(1962) was amongst the first books to bring widespread public attention to the hidden dangers of
synthetic pesticides and pollution, proposing that environmental degradation would surely
reverberate back upon humanity, causing mutual destruction.7 She outlined a world where nature
and civilization ceased to coexist harmoniously due to environmentally unsafe practices. This
narrative promoted general public support for the growing environmental movements in the United
States. Similarly, the 1968 photographs of the Earthrise from space taken by the Apollo 8
astronauts provided beautiful imagery of a blue and green Earth worth saving.8 By the 1970s, this
planet appeared under direct threat; the world Carson warned about began to appear, as

7

Rachel Carson, Silent Spring, 50th ed. Boston, MA: Mariner Books/Houghton Mifflin, 2012.

8

United States Environmental Protection Agency, "The Origins of EPA," EPA History.

6
urbanization and population growth manifested itself in smog, water supply contamination, and
burning rivers. Extreme events such as these spurred an environmental movement to protect
natural resources and improve the quality of air and water.9 The first Earth Day was celebrated in
1970 as a bipartisan embrace of these environmental concerns.
Nixon responded to the environmental movement by appointing William Ruckelshaus as
EPA administrator on December 4, 1970 and by organizing the EPA to consolidate the growing
number of governmental responsibilities associated with environmental research, protection, and
law enforcement. The new, bipartisan EPA was to conduct environmental research, establish
quantitative environmental baselines for pollutant emittance, and enforce air and water quality
standards.10 The quality standards laws took the form of the Clean Air Act of 1970, the Clean
Water Act of 1972, the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, and the Toxic Substances Control Act
of 1976 amongst other protective federal legislation, and the EPA was to regulate corporations and
other institutions to ensure they were in compliance with these acts. The EPA was therefore a
fledgling government regulator for environmental practices and a component of an increasingly
interventionist big government.

Reaganism as a Response to Big Government
The Grace Commission was a component within the larger scheme of bringing about the
Reagan Revolution, an ideological movement in favor of free markets, deregulation, and decreased
taxes that Reagan embodied and championed as U.S. President. While government activism to
reduce the amplitude of the business cycle booms and busts had been controversial from the time
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of the New Deal, proponents could defend this form of deficit spending as yielding a stronger
economy and avoiding the economic losses of recession. However, deficit spending on social and
environmental programs, which right wing opposition would see as a complete waste of taxpayer
contributions and overreach of government power, proved even more contentious in the political
sphere. Reaganites instead advocated for unregulated, laissez-faire markets that they believed
would efficiently allocate goods to solve social problems—a key component of neoliberal
ideology. Economic geographer David Harvey defined neoliberalism as “a theory of political
economic practices proposing that human well-being can best be advanced by the maximization
of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property
rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade.”11 Under a neoliberal ideology,
markets act as self-correcting mechanisms to optimize and fulfill market needs efficiently.
Therefore, in theory, governmental interference in the market in an attempt to create an efficient
distribution of capital resources was inefficient in and of itself. Within the framework of
neoliberalism, government’s role was solely to ensure that fundamental entrepreneurial freedoms
were preserved.12 This theory of self-correction and non-intervention translated directly to
Reagan’s policies of deregulation.
In response to the burgeoning regulatory role of government, Reagan’s neoliberal leanings
influenced his efforts to reduce “big government” through deregulatory policies. As a modern
federalist, or a supporter of a decentralized federal government in favor of states’ rights, Reagan
ideologically opposed federal government regulations and regulatory bodies. He saw regulatory
activity—even when this action was aimed for the public good—as a federal imposition into
11
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lawmaking territory it did not possess per the U.S. Constitution. According to Reagan, “federal
regulation grew from a neighborhood pest into a nationwide monster.”13 Reagan’s supporters were
drawn to this vision of free market capitalism and the fruits it bore—at least for some. On the
other hand, for critics of Reagan’s deregulatory, small government advocacy, the fruits of an
unfettered, unregulated market were unattainable for many, including those of a low
socioeconomic standing who needed government welfare programs for survival, as well as
consumers, laborers, and environmentalists who benefited from centralized oversight and
protection measures.
Seeking to deregulate and pare down big government, Reagan had the difficult task of
convincing Americans that decreasing government provisions for the public good could be
beneficial to them. This was a critical weakness in deregulatory policy. In order to garner support
for the Reagan Revolution from constituents who had grown accustomed to Lyndon B. Johnson’s
Great Society provisions, and from the politicians representing those constituents, the agenda of
the Reagan Revolution shifted the public’s focus to taxation. Reagan ideologically sought to
deregulate and strip down the federal bureaucracy in order confront big government, but in order
to gain popular support for this agenda, he focused his rhetoric on opportunities to lower taxes,
which was a more appealing prospect to U.S. citizens. However, a consequence of lowering taxes
was the need to decrease expenses in order to maintain a balanced budget and avoid deficits. This
necessity to lower government expenditures brought Woodrow Wilson’s ideas of utilizing business
management principles to cut costly waste and inefficiency from the government to the forefront
of Reagan’s political rhetoric. Reagan manifested Wilson’s concept of public administration
through the private sector-led Grace Commission, which would focus its advice to cut waste and
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inefficiency on an area of government that both Reagan and corporate America despised—
regulation.
The Grace Commission was one of many components of Reagan’s multilateral approach
to realizing his agenda of reducing the size of government through management reform and
government waste control. In 1981, prior to creating the Grace Commission, Reagan tasked newly
hired inspectors general with finding fraud and waste in government to minimize government
expenditures. J. Peter Grace recounted in his book Burning Money: “Early on, the President hired
some new Inspectors General to seek out waste. Their efforts simply highlighted how massive the
problem of waste in government was.”14

Reagan desired more than an identification of

opportunities for cutting government waste; he wanted a plan of action to yield results.
Beyond hiring inspectors general to find waste, Reagan created the President’s Council on
Integrity and Efficiency in March 1981 and the Cabinet Council on Management and
Administration in September 1982.

The bodies aligned the leadership efforts of various

government agencies and departmental leadership in a mission to control costs and increase
efficiency in the federal government. The President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency included
the deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget, who would be the council chairman,
along with the deputy attorney general, a number of inspectors general for different government
departments, and several representatives from other agencies.15

The Cabinet Council on

Management and Administration was composed of the Presidential Cabinet members and had the
role of helping to implement the Grace Commission recommendations. The Cabinet Council also
supervised “Reform 88,” which was a program to improve the federal government’s management
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and administrative practices by 1988.16 Amongst all of these programs and committees, the Grace
Commission was unique due to its use of businessmen who brought in private sector expertise in
an effort to make the government run as efficiently as a business.
Ronald Reagan’s ideological basis in neoliberalism and the difficulties with cutting out
programs to which the citizenry had grown accustomed prompted him to change the narrative on
government expenditures, focusing on the rooting out of wasteful and inefficient government
agencies and programs as a means by which to lower taxes. In doing so, Reagan created a private
sector survey for cost control that placed the responsibility of identifying such waste and
inefficiencies under the purview of J. Peter Grace and the private sector—a group of corporate
businessmen who shared Reagan’s deregulatory ideology yet were accountable to their own
shareholders rather than to the American public. This inherent discrepancy in stakeholders proved
dangerous when J. Peter Grace used his position in government to advance his personal agenda
and that of W.R. Grace & Co.’s shareholders at the expense of U.S. citizens who expected
consumer and environmental protection from the EPA.
J. Peter Grace and the Grace Commission, thus, offer a unique and compelling case study
of the societal dangers that arise when experimenting with running the government like a business.
Chapter 1 delves into J. Peter Grace’s past as an environmentally reckless businessman at W.R.
Grace & Co. whose government work followed the economic interests of his corporation. Chapter
2 engages with Reagan’s executive order that created the Grace Commission, contextualizing this
private sector survey to identify government waste and inefficiency amidst other public
administration efforts, and identifying the significance of private sector involvement in
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government. Chapter 3 investigates the conflicts of interest surrounding the EPA task force and
the deregulatory recommendations they offered, exemplifying the challenges of bringing private
sector expertise into the public sphere without simultaneously empowering corporate interests over
the public interest. Ultimately, this case study of Reagan’s deregulatory commission led by J.
Peter Grace interrogates neoliberalism’s marketization of public life and questions the extent to
which a corporate-conceived model of government efficiency can be achieved without
bastardizing the public good.

12

CHAPTER 1
J. PETER GRACE: BUSINESSMAN & PUBLIC SERVANT
Grace’s Corporate Presence
Born by the grace of God,
Dying by the gods of Grace.
-Libby Resident Gary Swenson17
If you have ever ventured into the attic of your home amongst the boxes of family
heirlooms and baby toys and found it blanketed with a pebbly, puffed, gray-brown substance, you
have likely encountered vermiculite attic insulation. This material is flaky in its natural mineral
form, yet when heated, it expands to 8-30 times its original size, serving as a fireproof, lightweight
material ideal for construction products, especially residential insulation.18 In the 1920s, Libby,
Montana resident Edward Alley was one of the first to take advantage of the unique properties of
vermiculite, utilizing a literally mountain-sized reserve of this mineral seven miles away from the
town of Libby. Alley found that he could commercialize this product which he named Zonolite,

17
Andrea Peacock and Jeff Bridges, Wasting Libby: The True Story of How the WR Grace Corporation
Left a Montana Town to Die (and Got Away with It), Petrolia, CA: CounterPunch, 2010.
18

United States Environmental Protection Agency, "Protect Your Family from Asbestos-Contaminated
Vermiculite Insulation," EPA.gov.

13
and in 1927 he incorporated the Zonolite Company. The
Libby vermiculite reserves located under Vermiculite
Mountain provided more than enough vermiculite ore to
create a global Zonolite market.19

In fact, the small

Montana town’s 4,200 foot tall Vermiculite Mountain was
one of the world’s largest known deposits of the mineral,
and product from this site would constitute over 70
percent of the vermiculite sold in the U.S. between 1919
and 1990.20 By 1941, annual global sales had reached
over $4 million, doubling the prior years’ sales figures.21
Zonolite and other vermiculite products from Libby were
making a killing.
Unfortunately, the “killing” pertained to more than
Figure 1 - Zonolite Advertisement featuring Bing
Crosby
Source: The Sandusky Register (Sandusky, OH).
Advertisement. October 3, 1956. Accessed March
29, 2021.
https://www.newspapers.com/image/4650288.

Zonolite’s sales figures. Vermiculite was not the only
mineral that Zonolite was extracting in Libby; the dust in
the mine was contaminated with high levels of tremolite

asbestos, a fiber of asbestos that had deadly effects on the human body upon inhalation. Exposure
to tremolite asbestos and inhalation of asbestos dust caused diseases such as asbestosis, pleural
effusion, lung cancer, and mesothelioma.22
19
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As early as 1930, medical research cited the dangers of asbestos, with British researchers
reporting to Parliament that “with continued inhalation of the causative dust, by its invasion of
new territory and consolidation of that already occupied, it gradually, and literally, strangles the
essential tissues of the lungs.”23 These British researchers further recommended that workers be
informed of the risks regarding asbestos dust in order to take personal measures to protect
themselves. In 1933, Dr. Philip Ellman, a tuberculosis specialist, wrote in the Journal of Industrial
Hygiene that “[p]ulmonary asbestosis, once established, is a progressive disease with a bad
prognosis; its treatment can only be symptomatic.”24 This meant that asbestos-related diseases
were incurable. Those exposed to asbestos could not reduce the damage that had already been
done through medical means; they could only treat their resulting symptoms. Further, Dr. John
Hawes’ 1937 asbestos research in the New England Journal of Medicine concluded that asbestos
dust exposure and inhalation was highly dangerous and could create “total and permanent
disability in a remarkably short time.”25 In 1938, U.S. Surgeon General Waldemar defined a
maximum allowable concentration of asbestos dust at 5 million particles per cubic foot, whereas
the Libby miners were exposed to asbestos dust particle counts over 15 times this amount by
1963.26 The medical dangers associated with asbestos exposure were thus publicly-known early
on in the life of Zonolite.
In April of 1963, W.R. Grace & Co. purchased Alley’s Zonolite Company and its Libby
vermiculite ore mine in a stock-for-stock merger transaction with four Zonolite stock shares

23
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trading for one share of Grace stock. The Zonolite acquisition was a part of J. Peter Grace’s efforts
to shift W.R. Grace away from South American shipping and transportation primarily to
chemicals—a decision made upon consultation with Otto Ambros, a Nazi war criminal and
chemist under Hitler’s regime. After serving his Nuremberg Trials sentence for his conviction on
25,000 counts of slavery and mass murder, Ambros became an advisor to W.R. Grace, as well as
to Dow Chemical and the U.S. Army Chemical Corps as part of Operation Paperclip—a program
geared to bring Nazi scientists and engineers into U.S. corporations.27 As shocking as this seems
that the American government engaged the help of Nazi scientists, the U.S. sought all available
talent in science, engineering, and technology to combat the Soviet Union in Cold War initiatives.
As an expert in the field, albeit one with abhorrent ethics, Ambros suggested to Grace that “If you
want to spend some money, get into the chemical business.”28
W.R. Grace & Co.’s foray into the chemical business was particularly dangerous in Libby.
There were three parties exposed to Zonolite’s asbestos-laden dust and subject to its multitudinous
health risks: employees working at the Vermiculite Mountain mine in Libby; Libby residents living
near the mining site; and global consumers of any Zonolite products. Dust was a constant bother
in the Zonolite employees’ daily work, as they mined (and breathed), processed (and breathed),
and packaged (and breathed) dry, dusty vermiculite ore. An October 1955 obituary in The Daily
Inter Lake of Kalispell, Montana described Libby resident Robert L. Field who died from lung
cancer after working for Zonolite Company for three years. While there is no way to know if
27
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Field’s cancer was directly related to his work environment, this was the type of illness that
investigators and health professionals would later associate with exposure to Vermiculite
Mountain’s dust.29 Notably, few workers at the time seemed to be making the connection between
their illnesses and exposure to vermiculite.
Employees were not the only victims. Asbestos was everywhere in Libby, as it dispersed
through the air from the mines into the surrounding town. With inadequate shower facilities (there
was only one), workers were often unable to rinse off and brought home the carcinogenic dust to
their families.30 Around 1980, a Zonolite mine manager donated Vermiculite Mountain mining
waste to build a local high school’s track. Soon after hearing that the track was paved with
vermiculite waste, scientists went for a run on this track with air samplers and found that they
kicked up dangerous amounts of asbestos fibers, indicating that Libby high school students were
doing the same.31
With fifteen to thirty-five million buildings nationwide using insulation from Libby,
notably including the World Trade Center buildings, this dust made its way outside of Libby,
posing a devastating threat to countless unknowing American citizens.32 Andrij Holian, an
asbestos researcher for the National Institutes of Health, stated that asbestos posed a danger to
individual users of the many consumer products containing vermiculite, including gardening and
insulation materials.33 While Libby was ground zero for the vermiculite health hazard, W.R. Grace
shipped this dangerous product around the globe.
29
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Even as W.R. Grace & Co. dispersed its Zonolite around the world and reaped its financial
benefits, it was fully aware of the dangers its vermiculite product posed. A 1965 Grace memo
indicated that air monitoring conducted by W.R. Grace detected airborne asbestos in downtown
Libby and by 1969 W.R. Grace testing indicated that the dry mill for the plant released 24,000
pounds of dust—with a 20 percent asbestos composition—into the air daily.34 Mine manager Earl
Lovick’s 1969 “Confidential Study of Zonolite/Libby Employees” presented staggering figures
indicative of the deadly nature of extracting the vermiculite ore for W.R. Grace’s Zonolite product:
“although 17 percent of our 1 to 5 years’ service group have or are suspect of lung disease, there
is a marked rise (45 percent) beginning with the 11th year of service, climbing to 92 percent in the
21 to 25 years’ service group. This suggests that chances of getting lung disease increase as years
of exposure increase.”35 Despite the findings of this study, W.R. Grace did not inform its
employees that their employment in the Libby Zonolite mines brought deadly disease with it.
W.R. Grace hid further research evidence on the dangers of Libby’s vermiculite in 1976
when they asked William Smith, a researcher at New Jersey’s Fairleigh Dickinson University, to
study the health effects of fibrous tremolite asbestos from Libby. Smith had published research in
1973 about the health effects of non-fibrous tremolite talc on mice, and this research concluded
that tremolite talc did not cause cancer or fibrosis.36 These results gained the attention of W.R.
Grace, who hoped for similar positive results on the health effects of fibrous tremolite asbestos
exposure. In order to safeguard against negative findings, their request came with Smith’s
concession that “all results of our tremolite study will be reported solely to W.R. Grace & Co. and
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any publication of the findings will be made only by mutual agreement.”37 Smith conducted the
study with tremolite samples from Libby in addition to samples provided by Johns-Manville
Corporation and the R.T. Vanderbilt Company. Due to this non-disclosure agreement, when Smith
presented his findings to the Society for Occupational and Environmental Health in 1977, he
reported fibrosis and tumors in the mice exposed to tremolite from Johns-Manville Corporation
and the R.T. Vanderbilt Company, but left out W.R. Grace & Co. The mice exposed to W.R.
Grace’s sample had extensive fibrosis and many developed mesothelioma, a rare and deadly
cancer, yet due to W.R. Grace’s efforts to maintain secrecy around their product’s dangers, Smith’s
results were not published or revealed to government agencies for decades.

Despite this

knowledge of the dangers, W.R. Grace & Co. did little to save lives as they continued to market
and sell their Zonolite—by then scientifically proven to kill—and put this product into buildings
around the world for monetary gain and shareholder value creation.
Zonolite was one of many businesses comprising the titanic W.R. Grace & Co., yet J. Peter
Grace as CEO could not claim he was unaware of the criminal activity going on in this product
division. Internal memos at W.R. Grace revealed that management and executives, including J.
Peter Grace himself, were quite aware of the hazards of Zonolite products to consumers and the
dangers of Zonolite production to their employees and Libby, Montana community members. The
head of W.R. Grace’s construction products division R.M. Vining directly told J. Peter Grace in a
1969 memo that “vermiculite ore from Libby contains tremolite asbestos. This material is difficult
to separate from the vermiculite at the mill and is usually part of the rock remaining in the
concentrate when shipped.”38 Vining further clarified his knowledge on the tremolite, stating that
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this material present in their vermiculite insulation product (Zonolite) “is definitely a health
hazard.”39 This specific memo, which exposed J. Peter Grace’s understanding of the lethal risks
his company’s product posed to both workers and consumers, implicated him as complicit in the
company cover-up. Grace kept Zonolite’s deadliness a secret from W.R. Grace employees, the
Libby community, and customers as his corporation earned vast sums from the popular product.
The company reported record profits in 1982, the same year that President Reagan asked Grace to
lead the Grace Commission.40

A Failure of Government Regulation
While corporate self-governance at W. R. Grace was potentially criminal, government
regulatory oversight of the mine and its product also failed to protect the public for decades.
Government intervention in Libby’s Zonolite asbestos began around 1944, when a state inspector
advised that Zonolite workers wear respirators for what he termed the “nuisance dust,” given its
low levels of silica.41 By 1956, state health inspector Ben Wake began regularly filing confidential
reports concerning Zonolite’s asbestos problem as he advised W.R. Grace on measures to curtail
dust exposure in the workplace. By Montana state law, he was only required to share the findings
with the corporation itself. Wake thus marked the reports confidential and the public remained
unaware. Wake later lamented that the weak workplace safety laws in place limited his ability to
enforce compliance with the laws, and the lack of both transparency and law enforcement yielded
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little further investigation into the public health risks associated with W.R. Grace’s Zonolite
manufacturing.42
It was not until 1978 when the first real threat to W.R. Grace’s vermiculite business came.
Employees of O.M. Scott and Sons, a corporation specializing in lawn and garden chemicals,
developed bloody pleural effusions—or fluid buildup indicative of lung damage—on the job.43
Scientists from the University of Cincinnati traced these cases to asbestos exposure and found
sacks of Libby’s vermiculite where these employees worked. The vermiculite was a component
of one of Scotts’ products, and scientists, health professionals, and federal agencies began to make
connections between W.R. Grace, Libby’s vermiculite, tremolite asbestos, and the deadly lung
illnesses of exposed workers. Scotts notified the EPA of this Toxic Substances Control Act
violation, and the EPA began investigations into Libby’s vermiculite ore soon after.44
Fearing that public exposure to asbestos in Libby’s vermiculite could be widespread, the
EPA assessed in June 1980 that “the extent of the exposure from vermiculite derived from the
Libby mine is likely to be large, considering that this source accounts for approximately 80% of
the vermiculite used in the US.”45 They coordinated a two phase plan to collect and analyze
vermiculite ore from Libby and other U.S. vermiculite mines, and then analyze samples from
vermiculite exfoliation plants, where the vermiculite ore was processed into consumer products.
They dispatched a team to Libby in October 1980 to carry out the first phase, yet EPA involvement
suddenly ceased soon after. The 1982 EPA report explaining the study’s sudden termination
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stated, “Because of priority shifts within EPA, the second phase was not undertaken and the scope
of the first phase was reduced.”46 The EPA gave no explicit reasoning behind their decision to
stop investigating W.R. Grace, yet a 2001 Inspector General Review of EPA behavior during the
Libby crisis determined that any attempts to address the asbestos contamination “did not result in
regulations or other controls that might have protected the citizens of Libby.”47 The EPA did not
publicize what prompted their priority shift or lack of concrete regulation, but its concurrent timing
with Reagan’s election in November 1980 and Grace’s involvement with the Grace Commission
beginning in 1982 was a dubious coincidence.
Alongside the EPA investigation, the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) attempted to investigate working conditions at Libby beginning in November of 1980.
When asked for employee health information, W.R. Grace provided vague data in return,
indicating an aversion to cooperating per NIOSH employees’ accounts of the events. According
to a Grace memo recounting the Grace-NIOSH interactions, after NIOSH insisted upon doing a
comprehensive epidemiological study of Libby’s miners, Grace officials told NIOSH
representatives, “this study could create a lot of loose talk with serious implications and have a
deleterious, unjustified and pointless impact on Grace’s vermiculite business.”48 Unsurprisingly,
W.R. Grace sought to shift regulator attention and publicity away from Libby, hoping to protect
their business interests in Zonolite. In fact, this desire to diminish regulatory power from
government entities such as NIOSH led W.R. Grace Global VP for Construction Products Robert
Locke to distribute a list of seven strategic options for W.R. Grace to combat NIOSH in November
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1980. Two of the strategic directives pointed to their belief that the new Reagan administration
would extinguish the NIOSH threat:
b) Be slow, review things extensively and contribute to delay. This might not be
bad policy generally and it is possible that the new Administration’s policies will
make NIOSH more selective in how scarce staff resources are allocated after
January 20, 1981.
g) Attempt to apply influence via congressmen, senators, lobbyists or others to get
it turned off. This might result in delay without turning it off. However, it is not
necessarily successful, can backfire and to be effective must be developed over long
periods of time due to the trust required.49
A poignant precursor to J. Peter Grace’s 1982 appointment to the Grace Commission, directive b
indicated that W.R. Grace executives anticipated that Reagan’s presidential inauguration on
January 20, 1981 would shift funding away from regulatory bodies such as NIOSH. Directive g
explained the nature of W.R. Grace’s attitude toward the government regulators and reflected the
political circumstances that likely prompted the EPA to shift their priorities away from Libby. Not
only did W.R. Grace have incentive to make use of their own corporate lobbying influence on
government legislators, but J. Peter Grace’s personal influence on soon-to-be-President Reagan
would be key to ensuring Zonolite’s continued profitability in consumer markets. For Grace,
Zonolite’s survival at all costs trumped consumer protection, with these directives aiming to
remove government interference in their business, despite the larger health implications.
Asbestos was not the only environmental hazard that W.R. Grace & Co. brought upon the
American people. Libby, Montana was one of thirty-nine EPA Superfund sites related to W.R.
Grace operations.50
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Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, in which the EPA ordered potentially
responsible parties to pay to clean up sites polluted by hazardous substances.51 Any funds not
recovered from the responsible party would come from a Superfund tax on chemical and petroleum
companies. Each of W.R. Grace’s thirty-nine Superfund sites represented the potential for EPA
regulatory intervention in W.R. Grace’s operations, creating a confrontational relationship
between J. Peter Grace and the EPA.

The most famous of these sites was in Woburn,

Massachusetts, where the courts found W.R. Grace guilty of contaminating the town’s water
supply with chemicals from its plants in 1986, causing a number of acute lymphocytic leukemia
cases in the area.52 Two years later, W.R. Grace pled guilty to lying to the EPA about the amount
of chemicals they used.53 This case—which gained widespread publicity from the book A Civil
Action (1995)—was made into a popular movie of the same name in 1998, compounding the poor
reputation of W.R. Grace as a polluter and danger to society.

Grace’s Government Presence
J. Peter Grace involved himself in government early in his professional career, serving
under the Eisenhower and the Kennedy administrations in differing capacities. He worked as a
member of the International Development Advisory Board under Eisenhower and Chairman of the
Commerce Committee of the Alliance for Progress under Kennedy, both of which advocated for
U.S. investment in the developing Latin American economy. Grace’s input on the matter was
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valued in these roles due to his “long and intimate experience in inter-American industrial and
cultural cooperation.”54 W.R. Grace & Co. had deep roots and heavy investment in Latin
American trade even as they were slowly divesting themselves in favor of chemicals by the
1950s.55 Grace wrote the International Development Advisory Board’s “Economic Program for
the Americas” report in 1954 to recommend that the U.S. government facilitate positive relations
with Latin America in order to promote democracy. He also sought with this report to show “the
pressing need for growth in inter-American trade and in the flow of United States private capital
to Latin America and the factors which have been impeding that growth.”56 As a result of W.R.
Grace & Co.’s stake in Latin American trade with the U.S., J. Peter Grace promoted himself as an
expert to advise the government on matters of inter-American trade.
Grace took on more Latin American relations responsibilities in 1960 with the Kennedy
administration as Chairman of the Commerce Committee of the Alliance for Progress, where
Grace advocated for U.S. expenditure on foreign aid. President John F. Kennedy specifically
tasked this committee with finding an efficient manner of utilizing government funds for Latin
American aid, saying, “So what we would like from you is advice on how we can make the
Alliance for Progress more successful, how our programs and expenditures of public funds based
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on your experience in Latin America can be carried out most efficiently.”57 Based on this, Grace
was becoming known as an expert on the efficient use of government resources, a trait that Reagan
later sought out in choosing a chairperson for the President’s Private Sector Survey for Cost
Control in the Federal Government.
Yet in assessing this experience in his 1964 article “The Private Investor in Latin America,”
Grace indicated a disappointment with the strict monetary discipline under Kennedy:
Attitudes of business as usual, under policies of strict monetary discipline, fail to
recognize the basic changes—the deteriorations that have occurred in the Latin
American economies—that make any such policies impractical without a
substantial infusion of new sources of capital…Unfortunately, foreign aid is not a
popular expenditure today and prospects do not appear promising for meeting our
commitment under the Alliance program.58
J. Peter Grace was disappointed that government expenditures on foreign aid to boost Latin
American economies were not high enough, deeming the government’s policies of strict monetary
discipline to be impractical and unfortunate. Grace’s desire to increase economic aid to Latin
America did not precisely fall in line with Kennedy’s task to use government resources efficiently,
but his motives were in line with his own economic interests. J. Peter Grace had more to gain from
his government service than simply the satisfaction of lending his time to improve international
relations. His company’s financial interests in Latin America derived from their stake in the
successes of inter-American trade, so diplomacy and private capital infusions into Latin American
economies were a matter of utmost importance to W.R. Grace & Co., even as the firm was in the
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process of shifting to chemicals. Grace called himself a “businessman long and deeply concerned
with this part of the world,” yet his concern was directly tied to his company’s bottom line.59
By the late 1970s, J. Peter Grace’s interest in public affairs had taken a marked shift, when
Grace began to critique the “big government philosophy” associated with the New Deal and Great
Society in 1978.60 Interestingly, J. Peter Grace’s shift of W.R. Grace’s focus from Latin American
shipping to chemicals coincided with his shift away from promoting government spending in the
Latin American economy towards critiquing government spending on domestic programs and
agencies. J. Peter Grace found the lack of adequate government investment to be unfortunate in
1964 when the expenditures would have benefitted his business, yet by the time the Grace
Commission assembled, Grace campaigned against “wasteful” government spending on agencies
such as the EPA. Grace’s shift in political focus molded to W.R. Grace & Co.’s financial interests
instead of adhering to any political ideology. This was an indication that J. Peter Grace’s
involvement in government affairs centered on pro-business and, more specifically, pro-W.R.
Grace policy.
Grace first publicly conveyed this policy shift when his doctor asked him to present an
address to a group of physicians at the University Club. Without an idea for a topic, Grace
recollected in a 1981 interview that “It was quite clear that President Carter didn't understand what
makes this system work” and he decided to speak “about taxes and what it is doing to the private
enterprise system.”61 After a welcome reception to this speech, an energized Grace felt compelled
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to convey his economic beliefs to a larger audience with speeches at universities and trade
associations. He also personally lobbied for the legislative changes he desired, with financial
backing and public relations support from W.R. Grace & Co. With W.R. Grace & Co. resources,
J. Peter Grace released newspaper and magazine advertisements on legislative proposals such as
decreasing the capital gains tax rate from 28 percent to 20 percent—a policy Reagan implemented
in 1981 that Grace attributed to his personal lobbying and advertising. Grace’s lobbying included
sending a quantitative analysis of the tax cut in a letter to every Senator and Representative in
Congress, forging political alliances and making a name for himself amongst legislators.62 In a
move that likely put Grace on Reagan’s radar as a supporter and political ally, Grace purchased a
Washington Post column and advertising space to challenge an editorial in the same paper that
criticized Reagan’s tax plan.63
In August 1981, with the assistance of the free-market, limited government legislative think
tank American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), J. Peter Grace compiled charts from his
previous three years of speeches on the U.S. economy and published the collection as Charting a
Course for America’s New Beginning. Grace organized the figures by subject-based chapters such
as “Chapter II. Too Much Government,” “Chapter III. Inflation and Government Spending,” and
“Chapter V. Increased Burden of Federal Taxes,” providing personal commentary to add color to
the graphs.64 Grace began Chapter II by saying, “the government has taken an increasing
percentage of output…all of this has been done in a climate of inefficiency and waste. At the same
time, commitments to social programs have exceeded financing capabilities and threaten our fiscal
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integrity.”65 He utilized the public administration-based rhetoric of efficiency and waste that
Woodrow Wilson had pioneered, and that would later drive the Grace Commission’s purpose. One
chart labelled “Expenditures by Federal Regulatory Agencies” depicted a 1,984.7 percent increase
in federal expenditures for regulating energy production and the environment from the years 1970
to 1979.66 This figure indicated an immense increase in expenditures on regulation over the
decade, but it did not include the context that the EPA had just been created in 1970 with a small
initial budget and was bound for significant growth as a developing environmental regulator. In
another chart depicting an exponentially increasing average daily spending by all presidential
administrations up to Reagan’s, Grace gave the title, “The Reagan Challenge: Stopping the
Trend.”67 In this manner, he challenged Reagan to decrease government expenditures, which was
already a major goal of Reagan’s. Charting a Course for America’s New Beginning served as a
strong political piece that was one of Grace’s many signs to Reagan that they shared a disdain for
big government.
Upon the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, J. Peter Grace was the CEO of a successful
multimillion dollar chemicals corporation with dark secrets that catapulted it directly into the
crosshairs of government regulators, particularly the EPA. Grace’s effective political advocacy
for interests he shared with Reagan, along with his prominent reputation as a successful
businessman, earned him favor with Reagan. The small government, pro-business ideas Reagan
promoted during the election certainly appealed to Grace as a businessman interested in lower
corporate taxes and a more lenient regulatory environment. Reagan’s approval and support would
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also provide him with a more direct opportunity to protect his own bottom line at W.R. Grace &
Co.

30

CHAPTER 2
THE GRACE COMMISSION: IMPLEMENTING THE REAGAN AGENDA
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the
United States of America, and in order to establish, in accordance with the
provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. I),
an advisory committee to study cost control in the Federal Government, it is hereby
ordered as follows…68
On June 30, 1982, President Ronald Reagan signed Executive Order 12369 creating the
President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control in the Federal Government. Amidst an
exponentially growing national debt, worsened each year with budgetary deficit spending, Reagan
sought a way to advance his deregulatory agenda under the guise of reducing the deficit to avoid
raising taxes. He believed he could minimize government expenditures by making the government
run like a business with the advice of businessmen.

Government Management Efficiency Before Grace
The Grace Commission task force members, according to Executive Order 12369, were to
craft management efficiency recommendations as a means to “reducing program waste, correcting
system failures, improving personnel management, and attacking structural deficiencies” upon
implementation.69 Reagan intended for the Grace Commission to apply these private sector
68
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business management principles to government to foster a more efficient and businesslike
government, yet Reagan’s stated goal was not novel, as several U.S. presidents had attempted this
before. Prior to Ronald Reagan’s administration, presidential attempts to minimize government
expenditures had been rooted largely in Woodrow Wilson’s method of applying management
science principles to government agencies and programs, with varying degrees of success.
The first statutory attempt to decrease government expenditures by implementing largely
management efficiency principles was Section 209 of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, in
which the president and executive branch took on the responsibility to develop the Bureau of the
Budget. The act tasked this body with the responsibility to “make studies of departments and
agencies to enable the president to determine what changes shall be made in their organization,
activities, methods of business, appropriations, assignment of functions, and regrouping of
activities.”70 This cost savings body took different forms and functions under the executive branch
throughout the early twentieth century due to budgetary restraints, an ironic notion given the costsaving purpose of the Bureau of the Budget.
The executive branch tasked each iteration of the Bureau of the Budget with researching
and advising on the practice of budgeting, improving administrative performance, and ensuring
efficient and economical conduct of government services.71 President Eisenhower filled the
Budget Bureau leadership positions with bankers and accountants during his 1953-1961
presidency, indicating a focus on economical and efficient management in the executive branch.
These bankers and accountants shared skillsets and expertise in cost-efficiency and budgeting, and
thus proved valuable to advancing the interests of the Budget Bureau. By 1965 during Johnson’s
70
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presidency, management improvement efforts shifted towards Planning, Programming, Budgeting
Systems (PPBS), a then-new management tool utilizing economic analysis.72 Thus, economists
joined bankers and accountants as government advisers on management improvement in the 1960s.
Still, the private sector remained an insignificant source of counsel for cost control in the federal
government, as these experts were all employed directly by the federal government.
Reagan’s unique contribution was in enlisting private sector professionals to apply their
own business management principles to government.

Yet while he advocated for the

businessmen’s prowess as managers, bringing in privately funded workers came with a stipulation.
The Bureau of the Budget utilized bankers, accountants, and economists who likely joined the
government bureaucracy after private sector work experience, and these individuals were on the
government payroll. This stood in stark contrast to the Grace Commission and its smaller-scale
predecessor in California, where the businessmen retained their private sector-funded payroll, and
thus their allegiance to their corporate employers and shareholders, raising a strong potential for
conflicts of interest.
Far earlier than his 1982 establishment of the Grace Commission, Reagan tested this
private sector approach while governor of California in 1967. Seeking to reduce the state’s $180
million annual deficit, he conducted a private sector survey of the state government’s management
and administrative practices in order to cut down California’s budgetary deficit.73 Reagan asserted
that while “government has never been accused of being a businessman…we can still make it more
businesslike,” enlisting approximately 250 private sector professionals who volunteered to look at
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government files and identify costly inefficiencies from their perspective as businessmen.74 He
saw merit in bringing private sector expertise to certain government functions, organizing the
volunteers into task forces based on their profession and industry knowledge. Reagan said, for
example, that “veterans of the hotel industry told us how better to utilize the space in our prison
system, how better to run the hotel-keeping functions, the buying of food and so forth.”75 The
resulting report yielded 2,200 options to cut costs after 117 days of full-time contribution by the
private sector volunteers.76 Reagan instituted almost 75 percent of the 2,200 recommendations in
his successful mission to eliminate California’s deficit and produce a balanced budget. Reagan,
thus, saw his Private Sector Survey for Cost Control as an opportunity to conduct a similar private
sector-led cost-cutting survey as he had done in California, but on a nationwide scale.

Formation of the Grace Commission
Section 1. Establishment.
(a) There is established the Executive Committee of the President's Private Sector
Survey on Cost Control in the Federal Government. The Committee shall be
composed of not more than 150 members appointed by the President from among
citizens in private life.
(b) The President shall designate a Chairman from among the members of the
Committee.77
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J. Peter Grace had put himself on the national radar as a person engaging with important
economic questions and had propelled himself into view of the Reagan administration with his
public lobbying and legislative advertising support for a number of Reagan’s policy initiatives.
With his prior references to the importance of cutting big government’s waste and inefficiencies,
as well as his successes at W.R. Grace & Co., J. Peter Grace was the perfect pick to chair Reagan’s
Private Sector Survey for Cost Control in the Federal Government.
“The President wants to speak to you,” Grace’s secretary Cynthia said as she barged into a
February 16, 1982 lunch between Rupert Murdoch and her boss, J. Peter Grace. Grace picked up
the phone and, sure enough, President Ronald Reagan personally informed him that his presidential
advisors had unanimously selected Grace to chair a commission of private sector management and
executives.78 Grace had never met Reagan at that point, but Grace eagerly left the meeting with
Rupert Murdoch and was on a flight to Washington D.C. within the hour.79 Reagan gave Grace
and his commission the directive to “work like tireless bloodhounds, leaving no stone unturned in
[the] search to root out inefficiency and waste of taxpayer dollars.”80 Grace accepted, later saying
that he had been watching and criticizing federal expenditures and was looking forward for this
opportunity to “substitute action for words.”81 Soon after Grace was appointed as the chairman of
the verbosely titled President’s Private Sector Survey for Cost Control in the Federal Government,
people began referring to it simply as the Grace Commission.

78

Kathy Williams and Robert L. Shultis, "J. Peter Grace, the President's Chief Cost Cutter," Management
Accounting (Pre-1986), 06, 1984, 22.
79

Williams and Shultis, "J. Peter Grace, the President's Chief Cost Cutter," 22.

80

Reagan, "Remarks at the Los Angeles County, California, Board of Supervisors' Town Meeting."

81

Grace, Burning Money, 52.

35
The next step after appointing J. Peter Grace as chairman of the Grace Commission was to
create an executive committee. Reagan’s Executive Order directed the executive committee to be
no more than 150 private sector citizens, and Grace sought out “the best and brightest of American
corporate talent, the chief executives of the nation’s leading corporations” with “expertise in sound
management of large enterprises.” The list included business management titans of the time,
including the Chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, the Chairman of Prudential Insurance
Company, the CEO of Exxon, the President of Coca-Cola, and the Dean of Harvard Business
School.82 The long list of businesspeople represented about half of the U.S. states and was
intended to be diverse and nonpartisan, with all members sharing the united goal of reducing waste
and inefficiency in the federal government.83
The executive committee created a management office to oversee day-to-day Grace
Commission operations, as well as 36 task forces to study government departments,
subdepartments and independent agencies of the executive branch.84 The management office,
consisting of accountants and management consultants, was to provide support to the task forces
on the “front lines.” The management office published 11 “Selected Issues Reports” regarding
topics such as wage setting, health care costs, and traffic management. The primary source of
Grace Commission recommendations came from the task forces. Each task force was run by two
executive committee members, with approximately 25 to 30 private sector members staffed per
task force. Figure 2 below references the task forces and selected issues reports:
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Figure 2 - A Complete List of the Grace Commission's 36 Task Force Reports and 11 Special Reports
Source: "A Complete List of the Grace Commission's 36 Task Force Reports and 11 Special Reports," In
Grace Commission, Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, 1985.

The members assigned to each task force came from corporate positions relevant to each task
force’s subject topic. For example, the Federal Hospital Management Task Force consisted of
executives and employees from privately funded and operated hospitals.
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Why Business Can Advise Government
Reagan felt bringing in the private sector to advise on government operations would be
appropriate and helpful because he, along with others involved in the Grace Commission, believed
that government shared inherent similarities to businesses that would legitimize the advice of the
private sector volunteers. J. Peter Grace likewise saw strong similarities between business and
government, presenting a figure titled “Why Business Can Advise Government” to the Senate
Finance Committee in 1984 along with the recommendations of his commission. The figure listed
operational “functions” in which both the federal government and the private sector were engaged.
These functions, common to both the federal government and the private sector, included lending
money, managing inventory, borrowing money, handling freight, and maintaining buildings.
Upon observation, these shared functions between government and the private sector that the
Grace Commission identified were financial statement items common to corporations.85 Due to
these similarities in structure and operations, Grace argued that a businessperson’s advice would
be applicable to government functions.
While similar in structure and operations, government did not share the private sector’s
dependence on profit for survival, a difference which Reagan and Grace promoted as an advantage
of Grace Commission recommendations. They held the idea that the private sector’s constant push
to maximize profit incentivized private businesses to perform better than the public sector, which
had considerably less incentive to eliminate waste and inefficiency. Grace relayed the result of
such a difference simply, stating that “everywhere in America it is recognized that the public sector
simply does not work as well as the private sector.”86 The Management Office commented on this
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important factor in Volume VI of its Selected Issues Report on the Federal Retirement System in
1984:
Private sector management is driven by the need to ensure the enterprise's continued
economic survival. This is a precondition for profit or any other measure of success
and the satisfaction of this precondition requires constant attention to managerial
efficiency and the effective use of resources in a competitive arena. The
unforgiving tests of both the balance sheet and the marketplace must be met.
Failure to meet the demands of either will, in time, bring the enterprise to an end,
with the attendant consequences not only to management but to the investors,
employees, suppliers, customers, and the community as well. In short, the private
sector cannot operate with a continuing and growing deficit.87
Thus, the private sector corporations’ responsibility to their shareholders necessitated a
focus on the bottom line and a need to operate without a deficit. According to J. Peter
Grace’s commission, the government, on the other hand, had little motivation to avoid
increased expenditures because its constituents did not actively seek to avoid a deficit,
instead desiring more expenditures:
Government has no such incentive to survive, let alone succeed, nor any such test
to meet. The Government, unlike private sector enterprise, is not normally
managed as if it were subject to the consequences of prolonged managerial
inefficiency or persistent failure to control costs. Such consequences have
historically been avoided in the public sector - or, more accurately, postponed - by
Government's propensity to increase tax revenues, engage in deficit spending, and
spend yet more money on failed programs with the result of masking their
ineffectiveness.88
Reagan and Grace’s belief that government worked less efficiently based on lack of incentive was
apparent in various areas of expenditure. Beyond just listing the shared functions of government
and the private sector, J. Peter Grace’s “Why Business Can Advise Government” outlined specific
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examples of the disparity between government spending and private sector spending on each
function, which he labeled “federal government failures relative to the private sector.”89 For
example, processing a payroll check cost the Army $4.20, while averaging $1.00 in the private
sector. Another example regarding nursing home management found that Veterans Affairs spent
$61,250 per bed when constructing nursing homes, while a major private sector nursing home
operator spent $16,000 per bed. Disparities such as these were evidence favoring why the
government needed businessmen to intervene with an effort like the Grace Commission.

Operating in a Businesslike Manner
Sec. 2. Functions.
(a) The Committee shall conduct a private sector survey on cost control in the
Federal Government and shall advise the President and the Secretary of
Commerce, and other Executive agency heads with respect to improving
management and reducing costs…
(c) In fulfilling its functions the Committee shall consider providing
recommendations in the following areas:
(1) Opportunities for increased efficiency and reduced costs in the Federal
Government that can be realized by Executive action or legislation;
(2) Areas where managerial accountability can be enhanced and administrative
control can be improved;
(3) Opportunities for managerial improvements over both the short and long term;
(4) Specific areas where further study can be justified by potential savings; and
(5) Information and data relating to governmental expenditures, indebtedness, and
personnel management.90
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In order for the Grace Commission’s private sector volunteers to carry out the process of
analyzing administrative control, personnel management, and other functions to operate the
government in a businesslike manner, Reagan desired that the task forces treat departments and
agencies as if they were looking at them for a merger or takeover, specifically that of a failing
business.91 In the private sector, identifying targets for a merger or takeover most often involved
detecting undervalued companies with improper management that could better realize their
potential under new management. Reagan’s vision metaphorized the government agencies and
departments as undervalued and inefficiently run businesses that could be saved with the help of
experienced and successful private sector professionals. For example, the Air Force task force
stated in their report: “We analyzed the Air Force as if it were a business we wanted to acquire,”
identifying “management policies, practices and routines we would change if the Air Force were
to ‘merge’ with our ‘company.’”92 By using this method of government analysis, the private sector
volunteers would utilize their strengths as corporate employees and executives. With this method
in mind, the task forces obtained their information to make cost cutting recommendations with a
combination of interviews with agency officials and access to agency data.93

A Volunteer Effort?
Sec. 3. Administration.
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…(b) Members of the Committee shall serve without compensation.94
Felix E. Larkin, a member of the Executive Committee of the Private Sector Survey,
proudly exclaimed the uniqueness of the Grace Commission’s volunteer-basis staffing: “I am not
aware of any other Commission or survey that has financed itself and has not been financed by the
Government.”95 A major selling point of the Grace Commission was that it was to be done at no
cost to the government despite almost 1,200 private sector workers being involved, yet this
volunteerism was not as beneficent as advertised. While the members of the committee lacked
compensation from the government for their Grace Commission work, they were not doing the
work for free as volunteers—they were financed by corporations.
Over 300 businesses seeking to support the Grace Commission created a fund to finance
their efforts in researching management and efficiency solutions by raising approximately $76
million amongst themselves. They pooled these funds into a foundation created for the purpose
of supporting the Grace Commission’s executive committee and management office in conducting
their responsibilities.96 In a September 15, 1982 statement to the Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, Larkin outlined the private sector funding for
the commission.97 According to Larkin, the foundation funding covered mostly administrative
costs, including “rent for office space, rent for furniture, for equipment, to defray telephone bills,
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computer equipment, services, stationary, and some employees, [and] staff support.”98 In addition
to the foundation’s contributions, the over 300 private sector corporations directly funded the
salaries of the almost 1,200 corporate employees conducting the survey.99 Beyond covering their
salaries, these businesses also footed the bill for the workers’ hotel and travel expenses.
Despite the appearance of being a volunteer effort, the corporations that footed the bills
and paid the salaries for the Grace Commission workers had much to gain from these contributions.
Having a penchant for efficiency, they were unlikely to provide a free lunch without gaining
something in return. For instance, while the private contributions to the Grace Commission were
vast, Ralph Nader identified that a large portion of these contributions were tax deductible as
donations, which would have offset the government savings with lost tax revenue.100 Thus, while
the private sector covered the direct costs of the Grace Commission, this resulted in lost corporate
tax revenue for the government, arguably an expense on the government’s part. Additionally,
funding the Grace Commission successfully deployed private sector workers into influential
lobbying positions in government, thus expanding opportunities to advance private interest
through the Grace Commission recommendations.

From one perspective, then, the Grace

Commission consisted of corporate volunteers using expertise to create an efficient government.
However, analysis with a more skeptical eye suggests that the Grace Commission businessmen
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made the expenditures necessary to gain the unique opportunity to directly apply corporate
interests to government legislation.

Grace’s “Sexy Items”
On January 16, 1984, J. Peter Grace presented a 650-page final summary report containing
the Grace Commission recommendations to President Reagan for his review.101 In the 1984 Senate
Finance Committee Hearing regarding the Grace Commission findings, Grace reported that the
recommendations if (and Grace confidently added when) all implemented, would yield $424.4
billion in savings over three years.102 For context, the 1984, 1985, and 1986 federal budget deficits
were approximately $185.27 billion, $221.53 billion, and $237.92 billion respectively—a threeyear total of $644.72 billion.103 Accordingly, Grace advocated that the Grace Commission
recommendations would help alleviate the government’s growing annual federal deficit without
having to raise taxes, if all recommendations were implemented.
The Grace Commission reports and the media presence surrounding them revealed many
jaw-dropping figures on wasteful government expenditures, which Grace called “sexy items.”104
The sexy items would gain the attention of the public, legislators, and others looking at the Grace
Commission recommendations, providing a palatable justification for businessmen tampering with
government. An example of a sexy item Grace referred to in his 1984 book Burning Money was:
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“The Health and Human Services Department has routinely paid out Social Security benefits to
some 8,000 dead people, whose need for them is, well, doubtful.”105 Another: “the Navy’s
Training Equipment Center in Orlando distinguished itself by paying $511 for a light bulb that
cost 60 cents at the local store. Another Navy procurement officer, Mr. Generosity himself, paid
$100 for aircraft simulator parts that cost exactly a nickel down at the hardware store—this is only
a 199,900 percent markup.”106 Grace was witty, humorous, and enjoyed storytelling, so his sexy
items were an effective means of advertising and conveying the need for the Grace Commission
recommendations.
Soon after the Grace Commission published their reports, there were voices of public praise
for J. Peter Grace’s foray into government affairs. Various newspaper and magazine articles
glorified Grace, with titles such as: “Waste Meets the Amazing Grace” (The Washington Post
February 1985); “J. Peter Grace, the President’s Chief Cost Cutter” (Management Accounting June
1984); and “Tycoon Preaches Savings to the U.S.” (The Washington Post September 1983).107
These proponents of Grace and the Grace Commission generally admired his successful corporate
background as CEO of W.R. Grace & Co., implying the value of a private sector influence in
government affairs—specifically in Reagan’s pro-business, free market-oriented government.
Reagan was very happy with the Grace Commission results and supported Grace’s push to
get these recommendations enacted as legislation, but he did not have the power to implement
them himself. Seventy-three percent of the recommendations required Congressional approval to
become law, so in order to make the Grace Commission recommendations anything more than
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recommendations, Grace had to gain some support in Congress.108 Then-U.S. Representative
Chuck Schumer commented that “you can point to some of the most egregious bits of waste…The
problem is not in finding them, but gathering enough political support to [correct] them.”109
Therefore, Grace founded Citizens Against Waste in 1985 to lobby for the implementation of his
reports along with Jack Anderson, a popular investigative journalist. Reagan was very supportive
of these efforts, sayings, “we must work together to get your recommendations through the
Congress, and that's what this people's lobby of yours is all about.”110
At the same time, critics denigrated the Grace Commission efforts, calling out allegedly
inaccurate savings estimates and questioning potential conflicts of interest and lack of
transparency. Amongst the anti-Grace Commission voices were Nader’s Raiders; these Grace
Commission critics were ideological allies and underlings of Ralph Nader, a political activist who
made great strides in holding government institutions and corporations accountable for
environmental, consumer, and worker health and safety issues.111 W.R. Grace & Co. was likely
on Nader’s radar for its numerous products and production methods that had put consumers in
danger. Peter Ajemian and Joan Claybrook of Public Citizen, one of Nader’s consumer advocacy
organizations, published a scathing piece titled Deceiving The Public: The Story Behind J. Peter
Grace and his Campaign (1985), inducing skepticism over the Grace Commission and its findings.
Ajemian and Claybrook criticized numerous aspects the Grace Commission’s structure, purpose,
and members’ interests. In another Nader-related critique of the Grace Commission, James
108

Williams and Shultis, "J. Peter Grace, the President's Chief Cost Cutter," 22.

109

Phil McCombs, "Waste Meets the Amazing Grace," The Washington Post, February 28, 1985.

110
Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at a White House Meeting With Members of the President's Private Sector
Survey on Cost Control in the Federal Government," Speech presented at Room 450 of the Old Executive Office
Building, February 25, 1985, The American Presidency Project.
111

Center for Study of Responsive Law, https://csrl.org/about/.

46
Packard Love of Nader’s Center for Study of Responsive Law presented “A Critique of the
President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control” following J. Peter Grace’s February 8, 1984
testimony to convey the Commission’s findings to the Senate Finance Committee.
One of Ajemian and Claybrook’s main critiques of the Grace Commission
recommendations was that they went beyond management improvement, delving into public
policy recommendations: “The commission was chartered to study waste and mismanagement, but
its largest recommended savings require restructuring social policies by the enactment of new
laws.”112 For example, recommendations that changed policies regarding student loans, farm
subsidies, and railroad retirement benefits fell outside of the scope of the Grace Commission’s
responsibilities outlined in Executive Order 12369.113 Not only were policy recommendations
such as these outside of the scope of the Grace Commission, but they were outside of the
management-related expertise of the private sector members involved. Terry W. Hartle of the
American Enterprise Institute commented on the role of public policy in March 1985, saying,
“Public policies and public organizations exist because they satisfy a public need or a constituency
group. Any policy analyst can identify a dozen programs or policies that continue to exist despite
manifold evidence that they are ineffective or inefficient.” 114 Hartle conveyed that there were
factors other than economic efficiency that went into policy decisions, and that policy analysts
themselves often chose inefficiency in order to provide services beneficial to the public need. This
suggested that in order to be effective as advisors to government, the private sector had to focus
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exclusively on managerial inefficiencies rather than delving into policy recommendations. One of
the main criticisms of the Grace Commission was thus this problematic merging of cost cutting in
areas of poor management and inefficiency and areas of federal regulation and social programs
that Reagan and Grace deemed wasteful.
J. Peter Grace acknowledged the political difficulties associated with cutting government
expenditures in his book, Burning Money, yet believed that the problems his commission would
face in implementing their recommendation laid not in the management-focused areas of advice,
but in policy-focused areas related to government benefits: “For every expenditure, whether sheer
waste or absolutely essential, there’s a recipient, and he or she tends to react strongly when benefits
are reduced or taken away.”115 Grace identified a strong discrepancy between the management
and inefficiency recommendations the Grace Commission set out to deliver, and the benefitreducing, regulation-tampering cost savings recommendations that were included in the final
report.

Grace failed here to draw the distinction between wasteful expenditures due to

management inefficiencies and expenditures on the federal programs and regulatory institutions
that Reagan deemed “waste” and thus sought to address.
The Grace Commission task force members themselves noted an additional weakness: the
limited time and resources devoted to producing a final report which they delivered just over a
year after Reagan first signed Executive Order 12369 creating the Grace Commission on June 30,
1982. The task force members warned that “it would be misleading to allege that each and every
recommendation is rooted in a uniformly high level of research, analysis and substantiation,” and
thus categorized each of their recommendations on a three-level scale of supportability: Category
I – Fully Substantiated and Defensible, Category II – Substantially Documented and Supportable,
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or Category III – Potentially Justifiable and Supportable. A Category I recommendation held the
highest level of supportability based on research, analysis, and substantiation, and the Commission
deemed these recommendations “convincing and deserving of prompt implementation.” Category
II recommendations “may [have] not [been] fully rationalized or documented in the report, but all
indications point to the desirability of proceeding with their implementation.” Category III
recommendations were “not regarded as fully supported in the report, due to time, personnel
resources, and other constraints,” yet the Commission deemed them “meritorious.”116
In addition to prefacing the report with disclaimers on the supportability of their
management recommendations, the task force members advised the reader to approach their dollar
savings figures with skepticism, urging the reader to “guard against drawing conclusions or
making dollar projections based on the disclosures contained only in this report.”117 In other
words, the private sector task force called into question the “supportability” of both the
management efficiency recommendations and the projected cost savings figures associated with
each recommendation. Given that some recommendations were lacking in a “high level of
research, analysis and substantiation,” from what basis did the task force members discern that
these were recommendations worth implementing, or even worth bringing to the attention of the
administration?
Within his Grace Commission critique, Love noted that although the ability to cut the
deficit without increasing the need for additional taxpayer contribution by addressing the
government’s waste and inefficiency was “the impression that Reagan want[ed] to make,” the
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savings estimates that validated this policy were overstated within the set of reports.118 Although
the task force members forewarned that many of the recommendations lacked proper
substantiation for their estimated savings figures, the Grace Commission members made the
recommendations nonetheless, making sure to include their questionable savings figures in public
statements. J. Peter Grace continually referenced the $424.4 billion in cost control that the
implementation of Grace Commission recommendations would yield in public appearances,
newspaper articles, his book Burning Money, and his testimony to Congress, yet Category II and
Category III recommendations constituted a significant portion of this figure. Further, the
Congressional Budget Office and the U.S. Government Accountability Office conducted an
analysis of 396 of the nearly 2,500 recommendations within the Grace Commission reports
representing almost 90 percent of the Grace Commission’s three-year savings estimates. When
they used federal budget accounting to determine the deficit reduction if the recommendations
were implemented in the years 1985-1987, they found that cost savings would be much less than
$424.4 billion.119 Upon their review of the dollar savings accuracy for each recommendation, the
CBO-GAO review estimated that the three-year deficit reduction associated with the
implementation of every recommendation would be about $98 billion, a fraction of the Grace
Commission’s estimates. While evaluating the cost-saving estimates, the CBO and GAO were
unable to make a budget estimate for 122 of the recommendations because they considered them
to be “too vague, or necessary data were not available.”120 This points to the possibility that the
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Grace Commission inflated their recommendations’ savings potential, or at least performed
guesswork, considering how vague many of their recommendations were.
The Grace Commission was rooted in prior efforts to reduce waste and inefficiencies in
government, including those of other presidencies and Reagan’s own California private sector
survey for cost control, yet numerous aspects of the commission’s structure and composition were
alarmingly different than what was outlined in Reagan’s Executive Order 12369. Under the watch
of Reagan and J. Peter Grace, the private sector volunteer effort to advise on managerial
inefficiencies turned out to be more of a corporate lobbying effort to influence policies they
deemed to be wasteful, inefficient, and disruptive to their corporate pursuit of profit.

51

CHAPTER 3
A CONFLICT OF INTEREST AT THE EPA & J. PETER’S FALL FROM GRACE
The EPA was a largely bipartisan agency until the Reagan administration attempted to
make the EPA more business-friendly, politicizing the agency with their appointment of corporate
lawyer and two-term Colorado legislator Anne Gorsuch as EPA administrator in 1981. Gorsuch,
a proponent of private industry who favored deregulating the government, advocated against the
Clean Air Act, along with water quality and waste protection laws prior to her appointment.
Gorsuch was joined by fellow appointees from private corporations that the EPA was regulating,
including executives of energy corporation Exxon.121

Consistent with her deregulatory

sympathies, Gorsuch reduced EPA staff by 21 percent between 1981 and 1983, targeting career
EPA staff for removal, and also reduced civil enforcement cases by approximately 75 percent in
her first year as administrator.122 After it was revealed that she and other Reagan-appointed agency
members were targeting career EPA staff on a “hit list” for firing, Congress began investigations
into her conduct as EPA head and charged her with contempt after she refused Congress’ subpoena
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for EPA documents in 1983.123 This ended Gorsuch’s tenure at the EPA as a pro-deregulation,
pro-corporation advocate against enforcement of environmental laws.
Reagan’s appointment of Gorsuch to the EPA was an overt and blatant move to weaken
the EPA in favor of corporate interests against regulations. This was indicative of the Reagan
administration’s pro-business, deregulatory agenda, which took a more covert form by gutting
agency powers under the guise of the Grace Commission recommendations to reduce government
waste.

The

Grace

Commission

published

and

presented

their

Report

on

the

Environmental Protection Agency, the Small Business Administration and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency to President Reagan in August of 1983. Despite the Grace Commission’s
purported goal of advising on areas of cost control “without cutting the quality of services,”
recommendations within the Commission’s reports, if put into practice, would have weakened the
Environmental Protection Agency’s role as regulatory watchdog for environmental protection and
public health in the United States.124
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) portion within the larger report was the
product of the EPA Task Force, composed of sixty private sector managers volunteering from
twenty-eight large petroleum, chemical, and automotive corporations, including Dow Chemical,
Diamond Shamrock, Monsanto, Union Carbide, and Shell. Their efforts consisted of a ten day
“in-depth diagnostic survey” to search for improvement opportunities, followed by a month-long
“in-depth study of these opportunities.” The task force obtained “extensive documentation” from
the agency for research, and interviewed a significant number of EPA employees as part of the
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research; the diagnostic survey involved 246 interviews with EPA employees, while the study
group involved 321 interviews with EPA employees. According to the report, the senior agency
management staff “demonstrated great patience in helping a group of outsiders understand the
intricacies of Government procedures.”125 Their final report included thirty-six recommendations
for cost control opportunities within the EPA.

The EPA task force estimated that once

implemented, their recommendations would yield $482.3 million in cost savings over three
years.126
EPA director Carol Finch observed in an April 19, 1983 memo that the EPA cost savings
estimates within the Grace Commission recommendations were overstated. “The overestimates,”
she continued, “appear to include incorrect assumptions, oversights, and miscalculations. For
example, for the Region I, II, and III merger, the PPSS indicates an annual savings of $4.7 million,
while the total annual operational costs of all three involved labs only comes to $3.3 million.”127
Finch’s observation suggested a gross exaggeration of savings, with task force estimates dwarfing
the total combined operating costs of the labs they recommended shutting down.
The Grace Commission’s Report on Federal Construction Management, also published in
August of 1983, contained some recommendations advocating for sizable change to certain EPA
laws and regulations concerning federal construction projects. While the EPA and federal
construction were seemingly mutually exclusive areas of government, federal construction
projects actually had major environmental implications. These construction projects included not
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only federal building construction, but also important federal infrastructure such as wastewater
treatment plants, electrical generating stations, and water resource projects.128

Wastewater

treatment plants and water resource projects were deeply intertwined with EPA water safety
regulations, and electrical generating stations created waste and air pollution worthy of EPA
involvement.

According to this construction report, the federal government’s self-imposed

“enormous and diverse requirements for environmental protection…have hampered effective
program management and increased costs in a variety of ways.”129 The task force consisted of
engineers, construction managers, and accountants, who conducted research mainly through case
studies to see the impact of federal policies on construction projects. About half of the twentythree recommendations in the Report on Federal Construction Management concerned
environmental laws and EPA purview on federal construction projects, and the total estimated
three-year savings was $5.5 billion, in comparison to estimated annual construction agency
expenditures of $32 billion.130
There were numerous recommendations to the EPA that fell below the assessed
substantiation level of Category I and appeared to weaken the EPA’s mission to protect the
environment and public health through research, to enforce air and water quality standards, and to
standardize waste disposal procedures.131 Ajemian and Claybrook’s Grace Commission critique
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pointed out six policy recommendations pertaining to the EPA that, if implemented, would be
favorable to the companies that the EPA regulated:
1. Extend the deadline for industry to meet Best Attainable Technology Clean
Water Act standards;
2. Accelerate the delegation of responsibility to the states for enforcing
environmental protection regulations;
3. Reduce federal funding for grants to the states for environmental programs;
4. Grant blanket permits for general classes of hazardous waste facilities;
5. Eliminate time limits on permits for discharge of pollutants; and
6. Close and merge with existing laboratories eight regional EPA testing
laboratories.132
Of these six policies and eight recommendations to which they referred, four recommendations
were listed in the EPA report as Category II - “may not be fully rationalized”, and one was listed
as Category III - “not regarded as fully supported.”133 This meant that the EPA task force members
did not have sufficient evidence to support over half of their recommendations that could weaken
EPA regulatory power over their own companies.

EPA Task Force Membership
When planning for the Grace Commission composition and structure, the Reagan
administration ensured that much of the details of the commission would be kept out of the public
eye and that of Congress. The task force members were unknown to Congress and the public
during the early stages of the Grace Commission formation because when Congress asked for the
membership of the task forces, their request was denied. Concerning these difficulties of accessing
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task force information, U.S. Representative William Ford said, “It is as if we were trying to get
access to our first-strike plans for an atomic war.”134

Additionally, Reagan structured the

commission in a way that “insulate[d] the Grace Commission from public disclosure, conflict of
interest laws, and the obligations of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.”135 Accordingly, “the
commission was structured by the White House so that members could spend less than 60 days on
its activities, and thus avoid having to file public financial disclosure statements.”136 This lack of
transparency indicated a strong desire on the Reagan administration’s part to keep task force
information from getting into Congress’ hands—suggesting there was something within the task
force membership to hide.
J. Peter Grace assigned numerous employees of large oil and chemical companies to the
EPA cost control survey task force. The rationale behind bringing in these private sector
volunteers was that their experience in EPA-regulated fields would yield an enhanced and
specialized understanding of EPA operations and purpose. For example, a chemical company
executive would have a deep understanding of the chemical industry, as well as experience in
managing chemical waste according to government regulation. Therefore, their recommendations
to the EPA would arguably have a stronger basis in experience than one who had worked for the
government their whole career, leading to better-informed recommendations. Although it was
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easy for the Commission to justify bringing
specialized private sector chemical and oil experts
into this public sector advising role on the Grace
Commission,

these

individuals

represented

companies entangled in cases similar to that of
W.R. Grace & Co.’s Libby crisis. A number of
the EPA task force corporations represented were
simultaneously being investigated by the EPA for
violations of EPA-enforced environmental acts,
according to Grace Commission critic, James
Packard Love (Figure 3).

Within this record,

Love identified a sampling of task force member
companies, along with a list of their alleged
environmental act violations. These acts included
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), the EPA Superfund (CERCLA), the
Clean Water Act (CWA), the Clean Air Act
(CAA), the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA)
and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and

Figure 3 - EPA task force members with active EPA
enforcement cases
Source: James Packard Love, "A Critique of the President's
Private Sector Survey on Cost Control," In Grace
Commission Recommendations: Hearings Before the Senate
Finance Committee, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), 146.

Rodenticide Act. These corporations, including Union Carbide, Monsanto, and Dow Chemical,
were subjects of ongoing EPA investigations and potentially faced heavy fines even as J. Peter
Grace and his team offered them positions on this Reagan-backed commission. W.R. Grace itself
later paid $54 million into the Superfund as part of its settlement for environmental violations in
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thirty-nine sites nationwide.137 A position on the Grace Commission EPA task force had the
potential to be a lifeline—one where policy-changing power and a deregulatory political
environment provided an opportunity to cut the EPA’s regulatory power.

EPA Report Analysis
The Grace Commission’s recommendations pertaining to the EPA were designed to
weaken enforcement, reduce resources, and shift federal EPA responsibilities to the states. Under
the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the EPA
granted permits for hazardous waste management facilities and wastewater dischargers.
Thousands of permits were filed annually, but the Grace Commission EPA task force asserted that
the resources necessary to handle the permits were wasteful due to a backlog of permits requiring
significant time to issue. Rather than recommending additional resources to address the backlog,
under Grace Commission section EPA 4: Permitting Process, they recommended that the EPA
amend the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act to allow for class permits, or standardized
permits, for hazardous waste facilities similar in design and purpose.138 While generalizing
permits to fit a greater variety of situations would allow for more permits to be granted at a lesser
expense, this would encourage less oversight over the specifics of each individual hazardous waste
facility. Additionally, implementing this recommendation would benefit corporations looking to
produce more hazardous waste by granting permission to do so more often and with less review,
encouraging manufacturing activities that yielded such hazardous waste.
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Later portions of this permitting section advised certain amendments to the Clean Water
Act. Recommendation EPA 4-3a, for example, sought to extend the deadline for companies to
attain Best Attainable Technology Clean Water Act standards. Essentially, this would lengthen
the time period where companies would be allowed to utilize outdated technology in processing
water under the Clean Water Act. Companies with outdated and potentially substandard water
processing technology had a greater potential for accidental water pollution than those with up to
date, best attainable technology. Recommendation EPA 4-3b advised that the EPA remove time
limitations on the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) contracts.139 EPA
Region V Administrator Valdas Adamkus commented on this proposal on May 13, 1983, stating,
“the recommendation made in item EPA-4-3b to eliminate a time restriction on all permits is
absurd. This ignores the regulatory responsibility of EPA.”140 Adamkus opposed this measure
because, by granting toxic substance discharge permits indefinitely, this change would essentially
remove further EPA oversight. Without the EPA’s periodic revisitation to previously approved
toxic substance discharge permits, it would be difficult for them to monitor that the companies
continued to follow safe procedures when discharging their toxic substances into the environment.
Thus, with a perpetual permit, after day one of approval, a company would no longer have the
expectation of periodic and consistent EPA oversight on their projects.
Grace Commission recommendation section EPA 2: Delegation involved delegating EPA
responsibilities to the states to decentralize and lower federal regulation costs. The section
specifically tied in with Reagan’s federalist agenda, where state governments would retain
regulatory power rather than the federal government. The EPA task force found that delegation of
139
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EPA responsibilities to states would alter the EPA’s role from a program enforcer to a national
program manager, meaning that the power to enforce the national laws would be stripped from the
national agency.141 Adamkus also criticized this recommendation: “The report ignores the fact
that EPA is responsible for assuring compliance with federal environmental laws. In addition, the
report does not appear to be interested in maintaining the quality of environmental programs.”142
Adamkus reasoned that without the federal government’s ability to ensure proper compliance with
federal laws, the environmental laws in place would become obsolete as a law in place without
consequences, assuming the states did not have the ability to enforce these regulations properly.
Directly undermining this effort to shift oversight to the states, the Grace Commission
recommendations also ensured that the states would not have ample funding to conduct such
enforcement at an effective level. Under recommendation section EPA 3: State Assistance
Program Grants, EPA 3-1 would limit federal financial assistance to the states for environmental
purposes, with these financial cuts meant to lower program requirements and expectations that the
commission considered resource intensive.143 By cutting federal financial assistance to the states
and raising the expectation for them to carry out EPA enforcement, Grace’s commission would
have put the states in the difficult position of having to do more with less. Director of the EPA
Office of Fiscal and Contracts Management Clarence E. Mahn wrote on July 21, 1983 that this cut
in financial assistance was “arbitrary” and that the proposal “should not be adopted unless
supported by analysis of requirements and the State’s abilities to effectively operate with the
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reduced funding.”144 Recommendation EPA 3-1 coupled with EPA 2-1 would increase state
environmental enforcement responsibilities while cutting federal funding to the states. This
combination indicates that these recommendations involved more than simply reducing federal
expenditures by increasing state responsibilities; these policies encouraged a weakening of EPA
environmental law enforcement by shifting this responsibility to those with less funding to carry
it out.
Within recommendation section EPA 6: Regional Laboratories, the Grace Commission
EPA task force advised in EPA 6-1 that the EPA consolidate their regional testing laboratories by
closing and merging eight labs. This meant there would no longer be a lab in each region. The
task force utilized a June 1982 report by the EPA Laboratory Consolidation Committee called the
Finch Report, which was an internal EPA report on the possibilities of laboratory consolidation
for cost savings. Despite using the Finch Report for ideas, “a significant difference in approach
between the Finch study and the President’s Private Sector Survey (PPSS) study is that the Finch
Report assumed EPA would maintain one laboratory in each region; the PPSS group was not
guided by the same assumption.”145 Despite the Grace Commission’s reasoning that four percent
of sample analyses required an immediate response, removal of eight regional labs would make it
more difficult and timely to transport samples.

Essentially, while implementing this

recommendation may have been more cost-conscious, the consolidation would have the adverse
effect of slowing down EPA investigations and hindering testing accessibility in the regions that
lost testing laboratories.
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A Conflict of Interest
The secrecy surrounding task force membership and the EPA task force’s self-serving
recommendations suggested conflicts of interest amidst the ranks of the Grace Commission. The
House Judiciary Committee reported on U.S. Government conflict of interest regulations in 1962,
finding that:
The proper operation of a democratic government requires that officials be
independent and impartial; that Government decisions and policy be made in the
proper channels of the governmental structure; ... and that the public have
confidence in the integrity of its government. The attainment of one or more of
these ends is impaired whenever there exists, or appears to exist an actual or
potential conflict between the private interests of a Government employee and his
duties as an official.146
According to this definition, J. Peter Grace’s concurrent positions as the Chairman of the Grace
Commission and as the CEO of W.R. Grace & Co. had strong potential to be a conflict of interest.
When J. Peter Grace represented the public as an advisor to government on the Grace Commission,
he presided over recommendations that had a weakening effect on the EPA as a regulator and as
an enforcer of environmental policy. W.R. Grace’s Zonolite coverup and their numerous other
infractions of EPA-regulated environmental protection laws gave J. Peter Grace reason to
deregulate the government and cut down the EPA. Alongside his own implication in overseeing
a set of policy recommendations detrimental to efforts for environmental protection and outside
the scope of the waste and efficiency-centered Grace Commission, Grace lacked independence
from his private representation of W.R. Grace & Co. and its shareholders.
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J. Peter Grace denied any conflict of interest amongst the Grace Commission corporate
members, saying “I can't imagine any conflict of interest at all... I've given an awful lot of thought
to that issue, that we have people who are not dependent on the government for their business
successes and are not looking for any favors. And they are just out there as individual entrepreneurs
trying to do an effective job.”147 Despite J. Peter Grace’s reassurances that his task force
membership was not looking for favors for their business, they certainly had reason to make
recommendations that could aid their companies and avoid consequence for their active EPA
enforcement cases on alleged environmental violations.
As chairman of the Grace Commission, Grace was not technically a government employee,
which blurred the lines between his private interests and his government service. Reagan and
Grace considered Grace’s leadership to be government involvement on behalf of a citizen. This
citizen-helping-the-government rhetoric ignored Grace’s inescapable ties to his family business,
and his duty to W.R. Grace shareholders to maximize shareholder value. According to Milton
Friedman’s popular shareholder value capitalism, the dominant, sole economic purpose of
corporations was to maximize shareholder value at all costs.148 According to this philosophy, J.
Peter Grace could not abandon his shareholders and allow his profitable Zonolite division to take
a hit from EPA investigations and fines.
While it is difficult to prove a direct correlation between W.R. Grace’s environmental
atrocities and the Grace Commission’s recommendations with strong potential to weaken the EPA,
J. Peter Grace was in a problematic position as an individual with a potential for direct influence
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on a regulator, being in charge of a company in the industry being regulated. Thus, J. Peter Grace’s
tenure as chair of the Grace Commission was a clear breach of conflict of interest laws. Reflecting
on the Grace Commission’s EPA recommendations, James Packard Love stated, “It is
inconceivable that the White House or Peter Grace made any effort whatsoever to avoid conflicts
in the EPA recommendations.”149 The EPA recommendations were a focal point connecting W.R.
Grace & Co. with the Grace Commission in a web of conflicts of interest between industry
regulators and the businesses they were regulating.

An Epilogue
It is important to note that these recommendations, regardless of whatever malicious or
self-serving intent laid in them, were in fact, recommendations; and it is unclear based on available
source material which of these recommendations were implemented, revised, or abandoned in the
years following the Grace Commission reports.

Upon publishing the Grace Commission

recommendations, J. Peter Grace’s Citizens Against Waste lobbied for the implementation of the
recommendations, but these efforts were balanced with concerned backlash from Ralph Nader’s
consumer protection groups and other citizens concerned about the repercussions of such
recommendations. On October 28, 1985, Reagan conveyed that a large majority of the proposals
were on the way to being implemented: “I've received a final report that shows we are going
forward with over 80 percent—as a matter of fact, 83 percent of the commission's
recommendations.” A portion of the proposals required Congressional approval, and thus posed
an additional obstacle for Reagan to implement. He continued, “Many have already been
implemented; others included in the '86 budget; and a number will be proposed in the '87
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budget…we have every intention of trying to implement as many of them as possible in the
future.”150 These budgets did not specify which Grace Commission recommendations were
implemented within them, yet Reagan assured in his Budget for Fiscal Year 1987 that his
administration “put in place policies that reflect our commitment to reduce Federal Government
intrusion in the private sector.”151 Regardless of whether or not the recommendations which would
weaken the EPA’s regulatory power were implemented as law, the EPA persisted in its
environmental regulation of corporations amidst Reagan’s deregulatory push. Yet it would not be
until the early twenty-first century that the EPA held W.R. Grace accountable for its Zonolite
scandal in Libby.
Following J. Peter Grace’s appointment to the Grace Commission in 1982, Libby’s
Zonolite vermiculite workers remained in the dark concerning lawsuits against W.R. Grace & Co.
These victims lacked the foresight to seek lawsuits against the company until the late 1980s, when
local newspapers in Montana began to publicize lawsuits between W.R. Grace and the aggrieved
spouses of sick or dead W.R. Grace employees. Dying Libby residents and mine workers began
to figure out W.R. Grace’s decades-long cover up and public awareness surfaced of links between
Zonolite’s asbestos dust and the disproportionately high lung-related deaths of Libby workers and
residents.152
In 1986, the Great Falls Tribune of Great Falls, Montana, reported that Lloyd P. and Alice
Maynard sued W.R. Grace & Co. for personal injuries from Lloyd working at the Zonolite
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manufacturing plant from 1957 to 1975.153 Maynard claimed that he was “kept ignorant of a lifethreatening risk” while working and developed restrictive lung disease after his exposure to and
inhalation of vermiculite and asbestos dust. In 1987, Ruben Fellenberg of Libby recounted that
after 29 years working at Zonolite, he knew of “a few old miners who are now on oxygen 24 hours
a day due to their exposure to tremolite.”154 Despite Fellenberg’s accusation, the article stated the
importance of Zonolite to Libby’s economy as well as the efforts that had been made in recent
years to make safety improvements to mining operations. In 1988, The Missoulian of Missoula,
Montana, reported that Fellenberg followed up on his commentary and, along with twenty-four
others, settled out of court for injuries related to their Zonolite asbestos exposure.155 All of these
plaintiffs claimed the company continually told them that the dust was harmless. Referencing
asbestosis, the wife of a forty-year employee of the mine said, “We really didn’t know he had
it…They took X-rays every year, but they just kept telling us that there was ‘no problem, no
problem.’”156 These local lawsuits were an important first step in taking legal action against W.R.
Grace & Co., yet the settlements required no admission of guilt by the company, and all related
documents and studies remained confidential.
Much of the evidence that implicated W.R. Grace in their knowledge of Zonolite’s
danger was not widely available to the public until Andrew Schneider of the Seattle PostIntelligencer exposed Libby’s asbestos crisis to a national audience in 1999. This set of stories,
titled “Uncivil Action: A Town Left to Die” catapulted W.R. Grace & Co. into high-profile legal
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defense and smothered them in subpoenas for previously confidential information and studies,
setting them up for an impending bankruptcy. With national attention on Libby, approximately
26,000 W.R. Grace employees, Libby residents, and others exposed to Libby’s vermiculite
around the country filed a class-action lawsuit, and the EPA conducted a more thorough
investigation alongside it.157 W.R. Grace & Co. was found guilty by a jury and had to pay a
significant penalty for their criminal act of hiding their knowledge of the dangers of asbestos in
their products. The numerous class action lawsuit payouts to asbestos victims and the EPA for
cleanup financially crippled W.R. Grace & Co. which then filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy in
2001.158 Since their numerous lawsuits pertaining to environmental hazards, W.R. Grace has
restructured, hoping to leave their tarnished past behind them.
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CONCLUSION
Twenty-five years after Woodrow Wilson’s groundbreaking article gave birth to the
science of public administration, Wilson revisited the issue in his 1912 article, “The New Meaning
of Government.” In the former article, Wilson advocated for bringing management science into
government in order to decrease government inefficiency and wastefulness and maximize dollars
spent on the American citizen. In the latter, he acknowledged that government involvement was
extending beyond the scope of politicians, or statesmen, to “minds and energies of every kind.”159
Wilson supported the opening of political involvement to all parties beyond the statesman,
including financiers, engineers, lawyers, and manufacturers to avoid government control by a
small governing class. Yet even as he encouraged private citizen involvement, he warned that the
statesmen involved should “seek to serve civilization and humanity, not a party or any selfish
program.”160 Wilson had the foresight to know that along with the growing inclusion of outside
voices in government would come special interests seeking benefits for their own interests, rather
than for the entirety of the American citizenry.
J. Peter Grace’s private sector foray into government affairs as Grace Commission
Chairman was a logical outgrowth of Wilson’s call for private citizen involvement. Yet Grace
was also a personification of Wilson’s fears, taking advantage of public sector influence to advance

159

Woodrow Wilson, "The New Meaning of Government," Woman's Home Companion, November 1912.

160

Woodrow Wilson, "The New Meaning of Government."

69
private interests against regulations. Citizens had no role in selecting Grace, nor the power to
remove him with votes. Thus, Grace held no democratic accountability for his actions, and
therefore could advance the corporate interests of W.R. Grace & Co. without the need to please
voters. Perhaps this corporate power in the public realm was exactly the tool Reagan sought to
dismantle big government. For Reagan, the appeal of applying a successful businessman’s
corporate concerns to government operations outweighed any public detriments associated with
Grace’s historically proven inclination to advance the interests of W.R. Grace & Co. at all costs.
In the closing remarks of his critique of the Grace Commission, James Packard Love stated
that “the legacy of the Grace Commission is likely to be a bitter one, of false promises in terms of
budget savings, and hidden costs in terms of the quality of life as programs that help the poor, the
environment, consumers and workers come under attack.”161 While Love’s assessment turned out
to be accurate, it is also important to examine the factors that led the Grace Commission to produce
such false promises and hidden costs. The Grace Commission legacy remains an example of what
could occur when empowering the private sector to engage directly in the public sector and, thus,
blurring the lines of responsibility between these inherently different groups. When businessmen
were placed in a position of responsibility to both the American citizenry (the constituents of the
public sector), and to their own shareholders (the constituents of the private sector), they were
inevitably forced to choose one party’s interests over the other. Under neoliberalism, markets
reign supreme to decision making, and thus, the businessmen’s interests would systemically follow
where their funding comes from. In the case of Grace, the businessmen were not volunteers, but
were funded by their corporate employers. While this was touted as a cost-saving advantage to
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taxpayers, it helped to reinforce the commission’s conflict of interest. Had task force members
left their private sector jobs and worked for the commission at government expense, they might
have had a marketized incentive to serve government constituents in their public sector advising
role, lessening the conflict of interest.
While Grace identified the many similarities between government and business that would
justify a private sector businessman’s advice pertaining to public sector matters, the government’s
duties go beyond a balance sheet. The government is meant to serve the U.S. citizens holistically.
Government programs and bodies do not solely focus solely on a business’ purpose of maximizing
profit, as Reagan and Grace’s pomp surrounding the Grace Commission’s mission indicated.
Harvey B. Storch, an external senior analyst of W.R. Grace, skeptically pondered the Grace
Commission’s mission in a 1985 interview: “Peter runs Grace to make a profit [but] you don't run
the Department of Commerce to make a profit…You don't just go out and get the lowest bidder.
You have to spread it around, you have to take into consideration minorities, etc. Businessmen
don't really grasp this.”162 Storch’s assessment of the situation reflected not only the need for
government to focus on social needs, but also reflected that during this time where shareholder
value capitalism was a dominant corporate philosophy, the private sector did not focus on issues
beyond maximizing profit—and this was coming from an experienced analyst whose job it was to
know corporations intimately. Building on the differentiation of public and private interests,
Charles T. Goodsell, a public administration professor, assessed that “proposals to cap entitlement
benefits or tax certain benefits reflect a massive political naivete. Other deficient suggestions
make economic sense but ignore nonfinancial public values.”163 Goodsell drew attention to the
162
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political importance of “nonfinancial public values,” explicitly differentiating between what makes
financial sense and constitutes a sense of public value. It is the sense of nonfinancial public values
that is eroded with the conflation of private interests and public interests.
As political philosopher Michael J. Sandel said in What Money Cannot Buy: The Moral
Limits of Markets: “Markets leave out morals.”164 The primacy of markets in the neoliberal
ideology precludes social welfare and a sense of nonfinancial public values that Goodsell identified
as integral to a well-run government and society. Under neoliberalism and a shareholder value
framework for the private sector, marketization espouses economic efficiency and profit
maximization for the benefit of shareholders, who share a purely economic interest in the corporate
entity. Thus, the private sector engages in efficient business activities to maximize revenues and
minimize costs. Problematically, the economic end of financially benefitting the shareholders is
often made to justify any means by which to arrive at this state, even if these profits come at the
expense of long-term sustainability, as W.R. Grace & Co.’s bankruptcy indicated. Despite
marketization’s purely economic benefits that suit a shareholder-oriented private sector well, there
are areas where market logics should not pervade, due to their potential to corrupt and its
unsustainable short-termism. Government, on the other hand, does not have a duty to shareholders
with an economic interest, nor does it focus on short-term profitmaking. Instead, its constitutional
duties spread beyond shareholders and beyond economic interest, “to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”165 These
constitutional duties demand more for citizens than just economic prosperity, calling for common
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defense and promotion of the general welfare—duties that can be fulfilled with provisions to curb
poverty, hunger, and the dangers of environmental and consumer hazards.
By involving private sector volunteers in the historied government goal of management
efficiency, Reagan promoted the neoliberal and shareholder value-oriented ideologies within
government’s structure. By enlisting corporate managers and executives with a duty only to their
shareholders to advise government on how its functions could be improved, Reagan empowered
these individuals to apply their shareholder value principles to government, and make government
more businesslike, despite their inherently different purposes and constituents. Reagan’s Grace
Commission enlisted businesspeople with an inherent and almost inseparable conflict of interest
who economized government’s fulfillment of its duties to its citizens with their recommendations
to root out government waste and inefficiency. This economic marketization of government
functions resulted in many deregulatory and government-shrinking policy recommendations,
corrupting the government’s sworn duty to general welfare.
The negative implications of market economies’ reliance on demand, or more aptly, selfinterest, manifested in the case of J. Peter Grace. Grace, in leading the efforts to bring market
efficiency principles to government, simultaneously recommended weakening the EPA’s
regulatory role as part of its cost cutting. This being the same government regulator looking into
W.R. Grace’s Zonolite disaster, Grace’s conflict of interest posed a clear and deadly threat to the
general welfare of the government’s constituents. Grace’s Zonolite secret-keeping helped drive
W.R. Grace earnings so Grace could fulfill his duty to W.R. Grace shareholders. At the behest of
Ronald Reagan, J. Peter Grace took the job to run the government like a business, for the benefit
of his own business, and in doing so, Grace managed to cut government expense, at the public’s
expense.
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